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Abstract—We study the trade-off between secret message (SM)
and secret key (SK) rates, simultaneously achievable over a state-
dependent (SD) wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal channel
state information (CSI) at the encoder. This model subsumes
other instances of CSI availability as special cases, and calls
for efficient utilization of the state sequence for both reliability
and security purposes. An inner bound on the semantic-security
(SS) SM-SK capacity region is derived based on a superposition
coding scheme inspired by a past work of the authors. The
region is shown to attain capacity for a certain class of SD-
WTCs. SS is established by virtue of two versions of the strong
soft-covering lemma. The derived region yields an improvement
upon the previously best known SM-SK trade-off result reported
by Prabhakaran et al., and, to the best of our knowledge, upon
all other existing lower bounds for either SM or SK for this
setup, even if the semantic security requirement is relaxed to
weak secrecy. It is demonstrated that our region can be strictly
larger than those reported in the preceding works.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
PHYSICAL layer security (PLS) [3]–[5], rooted ininformation-theoretic (IT) principles, is an approach to
provably secure communication that dates back to Wyner’s
celebrated 1975 paper on the wiretap channel (WTC) [6].
By harnessing randomness from the noisy communication
channel and combining it with proper physical layer coding,
PLS guarantees protection against computationally-unlimited
eavesdroppers, with no requirement that the legitimate parties
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share a secret key (SK) in advance. Two fundamental questions
in the field of PLS regard finding the best achievable trans-
mission rate of a secret message (SM) over a noisy channel,
and the highest attainable SK rate that distributed parties can
agree upon based on correlated observations.
The base model for SM transmission is Wyner’s WTC [6],
where two legitimate parties communicate over a noisy chan-
nel in the presence of an eavesdropper. The SM capacity of
the degraded WTC was derived in [6], and the result was
extended to the general case by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [7]. The
security analyses in [6] and [7] relied on evaluating particular
conditional entropy terms, named equivocation. This technique
has been widely adopted in the IT community ever since.
Recently, distribution approximation arguments emerged as
the tool of choice for proving security. This approach relies on
a soft-covering lemma (SCL) that originated in another 1975
paper by Wyner [8]. The SCL states that the distribution in-
duced by randomly selecting a codeword from an appropriately
chosen codebook and passing it through a memoryless channel
will be asymptotically indistinguishable from the distribution
of random noise. The SCL was further developed over the
years and stricter proximity measures between distributions
were achieved [9]–[12]. Based on these more advanced ver-
sions, one can make the channel output observed by the
eavesdropper in the WTC seem like noise and, in particular,
be approximately independent of the confidential data. This,
in turn, implies IT security. Notably, [13] and [14] focused on
tight soft-covering exponents with respect to relative entropy
and total variation, respectively.
The study of SK agreement was pioneered by Maurer [15],
and, independently, by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [16], who stud-
ied the achievable SK rates based on correlated observations
at the terminals that can communicate via a noiseless and rate
unlimited public link. The SK capacity when only one-way
public communication is allowed was characterized in [16].
This result was generalized in [17] to the case where the public
link has finite capacity. The optimal random coding scheme
for these cases is a combination of superposition coding and
Wyner-Ziv coding [18]. If the encoder controls its source
(rather than just observing it), this source becomes a channel
input and the setup evolves to a WTC. This is a special case
of the SK channel-type model that was also studied in [16].
B. Model and Contributions
A more general framework to consider is the state-
dependent (SD) WTC with non-causal encoder channel state
information (CSI). This model combines the WTC and the
Gelfand and Pinsker (GP) channel [19], and is therefore
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Fig. 1. The state-dependent wiretap channel with non-casual encoder channel
state information, exploited for simultaneous secret message transmission and
secret key generation.
sometimes referred to as the GP-WTC. The dependence of
the channel’s transition probability on the state sequence
accounts for the possible availability of correlated sources at
the terminals. The similarity between the SM transmission and
the SK agreement tasks makes their integration in a single
model natural. Adhering to the most general framework, we
study the SM-SK rate pairs that are simultaneously achievable
over a SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI.
The scenario where there is only a SM was studied in [20],
where an achievable SM rate formula was established. This
result was improved in [21] based on a novel superposition
coding scheme1. SK agreement over the GP-WTC was the
focus of [24], and, more recently, of [25] (see also references
therein). The combined model was considered by Prabhakaran
et al. [26], who derived a benchmark inner bound on the SM-
SK capacity region. The result from [26] is optimal for several
classes of SD-WTCs.
We propose a superposition coding scheme for the combined
model that subsumes all the aforementioned achievability
results as special cases. Specifically, [20], [21], [24]–[26], as
well as all the other existing inner bounds (on SM transmis-
sion, SK agreement or both) that are known to the authors, are
captured. Furthermore, our inner bound is shown to achieve
strictly higher rates than each of these previous results.
The coding scheme used herein is an extension of the
scheme in [21]. Namely, an over-populated superposition
codebook that encodes the entire confidential message in its
outer layer is utilized. Using the redundancies in the inner and
outer layers, the transmission is correlated with the state se-
quence by means of the likelihood encoder [27]. Constructing
the inner codebook such that it is better observable by the
eavesdropper (thus making the inner layer index decodable
by him/her) enhances the secrecy resources that the legitimate
parties can extract from the outer layer. The legitimate receiver
decodes the entire codeword.
Compared to the scheme from [21], and inspired by [26],
our superposition code introduces an additional binning of the
outer code layer (which also encodes the SM), that results
in an additional redundancy index. Both redundancy indices
are used to correlate the transmission with the observed state
sequence. Based on distribution approximation arguments we
show that the new index is approximately independent of the
SM and uniform. Since the legitimate receiver decodes both
1 The respective causal scenario was recently studied in [22], [23].
layers, securing the new redundancy index along with the SM,
establishes it as a SK.
Our results are derived under the strict metric of semantic-
security (SS). The SS criterion is a cryptographic gold standard
that was adapted to the WTC framework (of computationally
unbounded adversaries with a noisy observation) in [28]. As
was shown in [28], SS is equivalent to negligible mutual
information (MI) between the confidential information (in our
case, the SM-SK pair) and the eavesdropper’s observations,
when maximized over all possible message distributions. Our
security analysis follows [21]: the proof of SS relies on
the strong SCL for superposition [21, Lemma 1] and the
heterogeneous SCL [12, Lemma 1]. Since the past secrecy
results from [20], [24]–[26] were derived under the weak
secrecy metric (i.e., a vanishing normalized MI with respect
to a uniformly distributed message-key pair), our achievability
outperforms those schemes, not only in terms of the achievable
rate pairs, but also in the upgraded sense of security.
To conclude, the contribution of this work is as follows.
We propose a coding scheme that generalizes [21] and [26].
The analysis follows [21], which, in turn, implies SS. Our
result is shown to outperform [21] for SK generation, and [26]
for SM transmission. The latter is done by introducing a
specific example. Our achievable region is also shown to
improve upon the previously best-known inner bound on the
SK capacity [25]. The proposed region is shown to be optimal
for a certain class of SD-WTCs. Finally, we show that a
recently reported inner bound on the SK capacity for this
setup [29], that seemingly achieves higher rates than the
result herein, may, in certain cases, be unachievable. More
specifically, a condition seems to be missing in the result
of [29]. Adding the missing condition, it becomes a special
case of the result herein.
C. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section II establishes
notation and definitions and sets up the SD-WTC problem.
Section III states our main result – an inner bound on the
SM-SK optimal trade-off region. In Section IV our inner
bound is shown to be tight for a certain class of channels.
In Section V we discuss past results captured within the
considered framework, and illustrate the improvement our
result yields. The proof of the main result is the content
of Section VI. Finally, Section VII summarizes the main
achievements and outlines the main insights emerging from
this work.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SET-UP
A. Preliminaries
We use the following notations. As is customary, N is the set
of natural numbers, while R are the reals. We further define
R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Given two real numbers a, b, we
denote by [a : b] the set of integers
{
n ∈ N
∣∣a ≤ n ≤ b}.
Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g., X , while |X | stands for
the cardinality of X . Xn denotes the n-fold Cartesian product
of X . An element of Xn is denoted by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn);
3whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors
(or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x.
Let
(
Ω,F,P
)
be a probability space, where Ω is the sample
space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure.
Random variables over
(
Ω,F,P
)
are denoted by uppercase
letters, e.g., X , with conventions for random vectors similar
to those for deterministic sequences. The probability of an
event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while P(A
∣∣B ) denotes the
conditional probability of A given B. We use 1A to denote the
indicator function of A ∈ F. The set of all probability mass
functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ), i.e.,
P(X ) =
{
p : X → [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈X
p(x) = 1
}
. (1)
PMFs are denoted by letters such as p or q, with a subscript
that identifies the random variable and its possible condition-
ing. For example, for two discrete correlated random variables
X and Y over the same probability space, we use pX , pX,Y
and pX|Y to denote, respectively, the marginal PMF of X ,
the joint PMF of (X,Y ) and the conditional PMF of X
given Y . In particular, pX|Y : Y → P(X ) represents the
stochastic matrix whose elements are given by pX|Y (x|y) =
P
(
X = x|Y = y
)
. Expressions such as pX,Y = pXpY |X are
to be understood as pX,Y (x, y) = pX(x)pY |X(y|x), for all
(x, y) ∈ X × Y . Accordingly, when three random variables
X , Y and Z satisfy pX|Y,Z = pX|Y , they form a Markov
chain, which is denoted by X−
−Y−
−Z .
Any PMF q ∈ P(X ) gives rise to a probability measure
on (X , 2X )2, which we denote by Pq; accordingly, Pq
(
A) =∑
x∈A q(x) for every A ⊆ X . We use Eq to denote an
expectation taken with respect to Pq. Similarly, we use Hq
and Iq to indicate that an entropy or a mutual information term
are calculated with respect to the PMF q. For a random vector
Xn, if the entries of Xn are drawn in an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner according to pX , then for
every x ∈ Xn we have pXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi) and we write
pXn(x) = p
n
X(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ X
n × Yn
we have pY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 pY |X(yi|xi), then we write
pY n|Xn(y|x) = p
n
Y |X(y|x). The conditional product PMF
pn
Y |X given a specific sequence x ∈ X
n is denoted by pn
Y |X=x.
The empirical PMF νx of a sequence x ∈ Xn is νx(x) ,
N(x|x)
n
, where N(x|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x}. We use T
n
ǫ (pX) to
denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with
respect to the PMF pX and the non-negative number ǫ, i.e.,
we have
T nǫ (pX) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣ ∣∣νx(x)−pX(x)∣∣ ≤ ǫpX(x), ∀x ∈ X}.
Definition 1 (Total Variation) Let (Ω,F) be a measurable
space and µ and ν be two probability measures on that space.
The total variation between µ and ν is
||µ− ν||TV = sup
A∈F
∣∣µ(A) − ν(A)∣∣. (2a)
If the sample space Ω is countable, p, q ∈ P(Ω) and Pp and Pq
are the probability measures induced by p and q, respectively,
2Here 2X stands for the power set of X .
then (2a) reduces to
||Pp − Pq||TV =
1
2
∑
x∈Ω
∣∣p(x) − q(x)∣∣ , ||p− q||TV. (2b)
B. Problem Setup
We study the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, for
which we establish a novel achievable region of semantically
secured message-key rate pairs.
Let S, X , Y and Z be finite sets. The(
S,X ,Y,Z,WS ,WY,Z|S,X
)
discrete and memoryless
(DM) SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is shown in
Fig. 1. A state sequence s ∈ Sn is sampled in an i.i.d.
manner according to WS and revealed in a non-causal fashion
to the sender. Independently of the observation of s, the
sender chooses a message m from the set
[
1 : 2nRM
]
and
maps the pair (s,m) onto a channel input sequence x ∈ Xn
and a key index k ∈
[
1 : 2nRK
]
(the mapping may be
random). The sequence x is transmitted over the SD-WTC
with transition probability WY,Z|S,X : S × X → P(Y × Z).
The output sequences y ∈ Yn and z ∈ Zn are observed by
the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Based on y,
the receiver produces the pair (mˆ, kˆ), its estimates of (m, k).
The eavesdropper tries to glean whatever it can about the
message-key pair from z.
Remark 1 (Most General Model) The considered model is
the most general instance of a SD-WTC with non-causal
CSI known at some or all of the terminals. (See also [24,
Section II.C] and references therein.) Seemingly, the broadest
model one may consider is when the SD-WTCWY˜,Z˜|St,X,Sr,Se
is driven by a triple of correlated state random variables
(St, Sr, Se) ∼ WSt,Sr,Se , where St, Sr and Se are known to
the transmitter, the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
However, setting S = St, Y = (Y˜, Sr), Z = (Z˜, Se) in a SD-
WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and defining the channel’s
transition probability as
WY,Z|S,X = W(Y˜,Sr),(Z˜,Se)|S,X = WSr,Se|StWY˜,Z˜|St,X,Sr,Se ,
one recovers the aforementioned SD-WTC from the model with
non-causal encoder CSI only. Our model also supports the
existence of a public or a private bit-pipe (respectively, from
the transmitter to the receiver and the eavesdropper, or to the
receiver only), in addition to, or instead of, the noisy channel.
Definition 2 (Code) An (n,RM , RK)-code cn for the SD-
WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and a message set Mn ,[
1 : 2nRM
]
and a key set Kn ,
[
1 : 2nRK
]
is a pair of
functions (fn, φn) such that
1) fn :Mn×Sn → P(Kn ×Xn) is a stochastic encoder.
2) φn : Yn →Mn ×Kn is the decoding function.
For any message distribution pM ∈ P(Mn) and any
(n,RM , RK)-code cn, the induced joint PMF is
p(cn)(s,m, k,x,y, z, mˆ, kˆ)=WnS (s)PM (m) (3)
× fn(k,x|m, s)W
n
Y,Z|S,X(y, z|s,x)1
{
(mˆ,kˆ)=φn(y)
} .
4The probability measure induced by p(cn) is Pp(cn) . The
performance of cn is evaluated in terms of its rate pair
(RM , RK), its maximal decoding error probability, the key
uniformity and independence metric, and the SS-metric.
Definition 3 (Error Probability) The error probability of an
(n,RM , RK)-code cn is
e(cn) , max
m∈Mn
em(cn), (4a)
where for any m ∈Mn
em(cn) , Pp(cn)
((
Mˆ, Kˆ
)
6= (m,K)
∣∣∣M = m)
=
∑
(s,x)
∈Sn×Xn
WnS (s)fn(k,x|m, s)
∑
y∈Yn:
φn(y) 6=(m,k)
WnY |S,X(y|s,x), (4b)
and subscript p(cn) denotes that the underlying PMF is (3).
Remark 2 (Operational Interpretation of the Error Prob.)
The error probability in (4a) is defined by maximizing (4b)
over the set of messages Mn. The maximization is only
with respect to the message (rather than with respect to
the SM-SK pair) because, while the choice of M ∼ pM is
independent of the code cn, the distribution of the SK, K ,
and its estimate, Kˆ , is induced by the code (see (3)). A
similar logic applies for the subsequent definition of the key
uniformity and independence metric.
Definition 4 (Key Uniformity and Independence Metric)
The key uniformity and independence (of the message) metric
under the (n,RM , RK)-code cn is
δ(cn) , max
m∈Mn
δm(cn), (5a)
where for any m ∈Mn
δm(cn) ,
∣∣∣∣p(cn)
K|M=m − p
(U)
Kn
∣∣∣∣
TV
(5b)
and p
(U)
Kn
is the uniform PMF over Kn.
Definition 5 (Information Leakage and SS Metric)
The information leakage to the eavesdropper under the
(n,RM , RK)-code cn and the message PMF pM ∈ P(Mn)
is ℓ(pM , cn) , Ip(cn)(M,K;Z), where Ip(cn) denotes that
the MI is taken with respect to (3). The SS metric with respect
to cn is
ℓSem(cn) , max
pM∈P(Mn)
ℓ(pM , cn). (6)
Definition 6 (Achievability) A pair (RM , RK) ∈ R2+ is
called an achievable SS message-key rate pair for the SD-
WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, if for every ǫ > 0 and
sufficiently large n there exists an (n,RM , RK)-code cn with
max
{
e(cn), δ(cn), ℓSem(cn)
}
≤ ǫ. (7)
Definition 7 (SS-Capacity) The SS SM-SK capacity region
CSem of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is the
convex closure of the set of all achievable SS message-key rate
pairs. The SM (SK) capacity is the supremum of all achievable
SM (SK) rates.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of this work is a novel inner bound on the
SS SM-SK capacity region of the SD-WTC with non-causal
encoder CSI. Our achievable region is at least as good as the
best known achievability results for the considered problem,
and is strictly larger in some cases. To state our main result,
let U and V be finite sets and for any qU,V,X|S : S → P(U ×
V ×X ) define RA
(
qU,V,X|S
)
to be the region of all rate pairs
(RM , RK) ∈ R2+ satisfying
RM ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S), (8a)
RM +RK ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (8b)
RM +RK ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(V ;Z|U)− I(U ;S), (8c)
where the MI terms are calculated with respect to
the joint PMF WSqU,V,X|SWY,Z|S,X , under which
(U, V )−
−(S,X)−
−(Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
Theorem 1 (SS SM-SK Capacity Inner Bound) The
following inclusion holds:
CSem ⊇ RA ,
⋃
qU,V,X|S
RA
(
qU,V,X|S
)
, (9)
and one may restrict the cardinalities of U and V to |U| ≤
|X ||S|+ 5 and |V| ≤ |X |2|S|2 + 5|X ||S|+ 3.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section VI, and is
based on a secured superposition coding scheme. An over-
populated two-layered superposition codebook is constructed
(independently of the state sequence), in which the entire
secret message is encoded in the outer layer. Thus, no data
is carried by the inner layer. The likelihood encoder [27]
uses the redundancies in the inner and outer codebooks to
correlate the transmitted codewords with the observed state
sequence. Upon doing so, part of the correlation index from
the outer layer is declared by the encoder as the key. The
inner layer is designed to utilize the part of the channel which
is better observable by the eavesdropper. This saturates the
eavesdropper with redundant information and leaves him/her
with insufficient resources to extract any information on the
SM-SK pair from the outer layer. The legitimate decoder,
on the other hand, decodes both layers of the codebook and
declares the appropriate indices as the decoded message-key
pair.
Remark 3 (Interpretation of Theorem 1) To get some intu-
itive understanding of the result of Theorem 1, we examine
RA(qU,V,X|S) from two different perspectives: when the joint
PMF WSqU,V,X|SWY,Z|S,X is such that I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S),
and when the opposite inequality holds.
If I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S), the third rate bound in RA(qU,V,X|S)
becomes redundant and the dominating bounds are
RM ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S), (10a)
RM +RK ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U). (10b)
The right-hand side (RHS) of (10a) is the total rate of reliable
(secured and unsecured) communication that our superposi-
tion codebook supports (inequalities (33b) and (38b)). This
5clearly bounds the rate of the SM that may be transmitted. For
(10b), the MI difference on the RHS is the total rate of secrecy
resources that are produced by the outer layer of the codebook
(inequalities (38a) and (52)). Since the security of our SM-SK
pair comes entirely from that outer layer, this MI difference
is an upper bound on the sum of rates. Notice that the
reliability (10a) and the security (10b) bounds are reminiscent
of the original GP [19] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [7] results,
respectively.
For the opposite case, if I(U ;Y ) < I(U ;S), then the
second inequality in RA is inactive and we are left with
RM ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S), (11a)
RM +RK ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
−
[
I(U ;S)− I(U ;Y )
]
. (11b)
While the interpretation of (11a) remains as before, to un-
derstand (11b) consider the following. Since I(U ;S) is ap-
proximately the rate of the inner codebook (inequality (33a)),
I(U ;Y ) < I(U ;S) means that looking solely at the inner
layer, the decoder lacks the resolution to decode it. However,
the success of our communication protocol relies on the
decoder reliably decoding both layers. Therefore, in this case,
some of the rate from the outer layer is allocated to convey
the inner layer index. Recalling that our security analysis is
based on revealing the inner layer to the eavesdropper, this
rate allocation effectively results in a loss of I(U ;S)−I(U ;Y )
in the secrecy resources of the outer layer, giving rise to the
rate bound from (11b).
Remark 4 (Optimization Domain) It was shown in [21]
that when RK = 0, we may restrict the optimization in The-
orem 1 to joint PMFs qU,V,X|S satisfying I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S)
without inflicting any reduction in the achievable SM-rate.
However, the proof from [21] does not extend to the case
when RK > 0. Currently, it remains unknown whether or
not maximizing only over PMFs with I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S) is
sufficient to exhaust RA when RK > 0.
Remark 5 (Alternative Representations of RA) By defin-
ing V˜ = (U, V ), we see that it suffices to restrict the
maximization in (9) to joint PMFs that satisfy the Markov
chain U−
−V˜−
−(S,X)−
−(Y, Z).
Regardless of that, the two bounds on RM +RK from (8b)-
(8c) can be equivalently written as the single bound
RM +RK ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;Z)
−max
{
I(U ;Y ), I(U ;S)
}
+ I(U ;Z). (12)
In this form, it is evident that maximizing only over joint
PMFs satisfying I(U ;Z) ≥ max
{
I(U ;Y ), I(U ;S)
}
attains
optimality. Indeed, if the opposite inequality holds, one could
always choose V˜ = (U, V ) and U˜ = ∅ to achieve higher rates.
Remark 6 (Cardinality Bounds) The cardinality bounds on
the auxiliary random variables U and V in Theorem 1 are
established by standard application of the Eggleston-Fenchel-
Carathe´odory theorem [30, Theorem 18] twice. The details
are omitted.
Remark 7 (Adaptation to the Rate-Equivocation) A confi-
dential transmission of a SM requires channel resources for
both reliability and security. The lesser of the two resources,
therefore, limits the feasible transmission rates. The main focus
of this paper is utilization of the residual secrecy resources
that the SD-WTC offers. However, if secrecy is the lesser
resource, the superior capability of the channel to support
reliable communication may be utilized by considering a Rate-
Equivocation framework.
Equivocation represents the portion of the message that
can be secured from the eavesdropper. (See [7], [31] for
formal definitions.) The rate-equivocation framework enables
communicating at rates higher than the SM capacity, as long
as full secrecy is forfeited.
By adaptation of the arguments from the proof of Theorem 1
(see Section VI), it naturally extends to an inner bound on
the rate-equivocation region of the considered SD-WTC. The
achievable rate-equivocation region is attained from (8) by
substituting RM in the left-hand side (LHS) of (8a) with the
total reliable rate R, and substituting RM+RK in the LHS of
(8b) and (8c) with the equivocation rate RE . For more details
see [2].
IV. TIGHT CAPACITY RESULTS
An operationally appealing special case of the considered
SD-WTC is the following. Assume that WY,Z|S,X is such
that the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the main
channel, but that the legitimate parties share a SK L ∼ WnL
(independent of the state sequence S ∼ WnS ), using which
they secure the confidential data. The setup is illustrated in
Fig. 2.
Formally, let L, S, X , Y and Z be the alphabets of
the key, the state, the channel input and the two chan-
nel outputs, respectively. The considered instance is the(
S˜,X , Y˜,Z,WS˜ ,WY˜,Z|S˜,X
)
SD-WTC with S˜ = L × S,
Y˜ = L×Y , WS˜ = WL ×WS , S˜ = (L, S), Y˜ = (L
′, Y ), and
whose channel transition matrix factors as
WY˜,Z|S˜,X =W(L′,Y ),Z|(L,S),X = 1{L′=L}WY,Z|S,X , (13)
where WY,Z|S,X is such that Z is less noisy than Y . A less
noisy Z means that I(U ;Y ) ≤ I(U ;Z) for any random
variable U for which U−
−(S,X)−
−(Y, Z) forms a Markov
chain. We refer to this special case as the SD less-noisy-
eavesdropper WTC with a key.
Theorem 1 applies here since the above case is a certain
instance of a SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI. As
subsequently shown, the obtained inner bound is tight, thus
characterizing the SS SM-SK capacity region of the SD less-
noisy-eavesdropper WTC with a key. The following corollary
states the result.
Corollary 1 (SM-SK Capacity Region) The SS SM-SK ca-
pacity region of the SD less-noisy-eavesdropper WTC with
a key is the set of all SM-SK rate pairs (RM , RK) ∈ R
2
+
satisfying
RM ≤ max
qU,X|S
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)] , (14a)
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RK +RM ≤ H(L), (14b)
where the MI terms in (14a) are with respect to the joint PMF
WSqU,X|SWY |S,X .
The proof of Corollary 1 is relegated to Appendix A. Note that
while (14a) bounds the total communication rate as a function
only of the communication channel, (14b) bounds the total
secrecy rate depending solely on the secret source.
A direct consequence of Corollary 1 is that when no SK is
to be established between the legitimate parties, i.e., RK = 0,
the best attainable SM rate is
CSM = min
{
max
qU,X|S
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
]
, H(L)
}
. (15)
A simple separation-based coding scheme achieves the SM
capacity from (15). Namely, using a capacity achieving error
correction code, the channel is effectively converted into a
reliable bit-pipe. Each of the legitimate parties compresses L,
which results in a uniform random variable. The latter is used
to encrypt the SM via a one-time pad. The encrypted message
is then transmitted over the reliable bit-pipe. Therefore, The
achievable SM rate is equal to the minimum of the capacity
of the channel maxqU,X|S
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
]
and the rate of
the key H(L).
While this scheme may seem very natural, to the best
of our knowledge, none of the past achievability results for
the SD-WTC with non-causal CSI prior to [21] attain its
performance. In Section V-A1, a special case of this setup
is used to demonstrate the improvement of our result over
the previous benchmark achievable SM-SK region for the SD-
WTC from [26].
V. PREVIOUS RESULTS AS SPECIAL CASES
We compare the result of Theorem 1 to those from related
past works. The previously best known inner bound on the
SM-SK trade-off region attainable over the considered SD-
WTC is [26, Theorem 1]. The next subsection restates this
inner bound and shows that Theorem 1 can strictly outperform
it. Afterwards, we provide a comparison to the best past
achievability results for only SM transmission [21] or only SK
agreement [25]. The achievability result from [21] captures the
previous lower bounds on the SM capacity of the SD-WTC
from [20], [32], [33]. The SK achievability results from [25]
subsume previous lower bounds on the SK generation rate,
such as [17], [24], [34]. Relating to one another these three
benchmarks that we use to evaluate the performance of The-
orem 1, we note that while [21] recovers [26] when there is
only a SM (RK = 0), [25] and [26] do not imply one another.
It is noteworthy that many of the above mentioned achiev-
ability results were shown to be optimal for special instances
of the studied model. Naturally, in all those cases, our result
is optimal as well.
Remark 8 Another result on SK generation over SD-WTCs
with non-causal CSI is found in [29]. Theorem 1 therein, which
seemingly attains higher SK rates than both schemes from [25]
and our inner bound, is incorrect. The region suggested in [29,
Theorem 1], in certain cases, exceeds the SK capacity, since
it does not account for the loss in secrecy-rate when the inner
layer codeword cannot be decoded on its own by the legitimate
decoder, i.e., when I(U ;S) > I(U ;Y ). (See the second case
in Remark 3 for a further explanation.) For this reason, we
chose [25] as a benchmark for the SK generation problem.
Looking at the proof of [29, Theorem 1], we conjecture that
an additional constraint was assumed without being explicitly
stated. Following the notations from [29], the missing con-
straint seems to be
Cp + I(W ; Yˇ ) > I(W ;S), (16)
which would assure decodability of the inner code layer by the
legitimate receiver without relying on the outer layer. Taking
the additional constraint into consideration, our inner bound
from Theorem 1 recovers the amended Theorem 1 from [29]
as follows.
We use (U˜, V˜, X˜, S˜, Y˜, Z˜) to denote the inner layer, the outer
layer, the channel input, the encoder CSI, and the observations
of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, in
Theorem 1 of [29]. These were originally denoted, respectively,
byW , U , X , S, Yˇ and Zˇ . To adjust our model to that of [29],
we identify X = (X˜,Φ), Y = (Y˜,Φ), Z = (Z˜,Φ), S = S˜
in Theorem 1, where Φ is the random variable representing
the input (and the outputs) of the public communication link.
In order to comply with the rate restriction on the public link
from [29], we restrict the distribution of Φ to have H(Φ) ≤
CP . Finally, we set:
1) RM = 0.
2) Φ independent of (U˜, V˜, X˜, S˜, Y˜, Z˜) with maximal en-
tropy, i.e., such that H(Φ) = CP .
3) U = (U˜,Φ), V = (U˜, V˜,Φ).
With respect to the above, substituting (U, V,X, Y, Z, S)
into (8) and maximizing only over distributions that satisfy
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) > 0 produces the amended version of [29,
Theorem 1].
To conclude the discussion of [29, Theorem 1] in its
original form, a specific example showing the rates from that
achievability formula to be exceeding the SK capacity is given
in Appendix B. We note that the missing condition in [29,
Theorem 1] does not seem to affect the correctness of the bulk
of the other results therein.
7A. SM-SK Trade-off Region
The result of Theorem 1 recovers the previously best known
achievable SM-SK trade-off region over the SD-WTC with
non-causal encoder CSI [26]. In [26, Theorem 1] the following
region was established:
RPER ,
⋃
qUqV,X|U,S
RPER
(
qUqV,X|U,S
)
, (17a)
where, for any qU ∈ P(U) and qV,X|U,S : U×S → P(V×X ),
RPER
(
qU × qV,X|U,S
)
, (17b){
(RM , RK) ∈ R
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣RM ≤ I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S),RM +RK ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
}
,
and the MI terms are taken with respect to
WSqUqV,X|U,SWY,Z|S,X , i.e., U and S are independent
and (U, V )−
−(S,X)−
−(Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
First note that Theorem 1 recoversRPER by restricting U to
be independent of S in RA. This is since for an independent
pair (U, S), we have I(U ;S) = 0, while I(U, V ;Y ) ≥
I(V ;Y |U) always holds. Consequently, the third rate bound
in RA becomes redundant and RPER is recovered.
The result from [26] was derived under the weak secrecy
metric (i.e., a vanishing normalized MI 1
n
I(M,K;Z) between
the SM-SK pair and the eavesdropper’s observation sequence,
where the message is assumed to be uniform). Our achiev-
ability, on the other hand, ensures SS. Theorem 1, therefore,
improves upon [26, Theorem 1] both in the rates it achieves
and in the sense of security it provides.
1) Achieving Strictly Higher Rates: Since [26, Theorem
1] allows only inner layer random variables U that are in-
dependent of the state, Gelfand-Pinsker coding [19], which
generally requires correlating U with S, is not supported in
the inner layer. Instead, only Shannon’s Strategies coding [35],
which operates with independent U and S is allowed. The
latter is optimal if the encoder observes the state causally,
but is generally sub-optimal when non-causal encoder CSI
is available. To demonstrate the improvement of Theorem 1
over [26] we exploit the aforementioned limitation of the
scheme therein, along with the observation that it is beneficial
to exploit any part of a considered SD-WTC that is better
observable by the eavesdropper to transmit the inner layer of
the code.
Let X = G = L = E = {0, 1}, S = {0, 1, 2},
Y = {0, 1, ?}, where ? /∈ {0, 1} and Z = X × S. Consider
the SD less-noisy-eavesdropper WTC with a key (defined in
Section IV) shown in Fig. 3, whose transition probability
WY,Z|S,X , key L ∼ WL and state S ∼ WS are defined by
the three parameters λ, ǫ, σ ∈ (0, 0.5) as follows:
• L, S and E are independent random variables with L ∼
Ber(λ), E ∼ Ber(ǫ) and
WS(0) =WS(1) =
σ
2
; WS(2) = 1− σ. (18)
The joint distribution of (L, S,E) is denoted by
WL,S,E =WLWSWE .
• The Memory with Stuck-at-Faults (MSAF) [36] is a
deterministic SD channel, driven by a ternary state S. The
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binary input and output symbols X and G, respectively,
are related through the function g : S ×X → G given by
g(s, x) =
{
s, s ∈ {0, 1}
x, s = 2
. (19)
• The output of the MSAF channel is fed into a Binary
Erasure Channel with erasure probability ǫ (abbreviated
as a BEC(ǫ)). The input G and the ternary output Y of
the BEC(ǫ) are related by means of the erasure random
variable E through the function y : E × G → Y , where
y(e, g) =
{
g, e = 0
?, e = 1
. (20)
• Z = (S,X), i.e., the eavesdropper noiselessly observes
the transmitted symbol X and the state random variable
S.
With respect to the above definitions, the transition matrix
of the SD less-noisy-eavesdropper with channel WY,Z|S,X is
WY,Z|S,X(y
′, z|s, x)
=
∑
g′∈{0,1}
e∈{0,1}
WE(e)WG,Y,Z|S,X,E(g
′, y′, z|s, x, e), (21a)
where
WG,Y,Z|S,X,E = 1{G=g(S,X)}∩{Y=y(E,G)}∩{Z=(S,X)}.
(21b)
A possible interpretation of this communication scenario is
when the legitimate parties communicate through a public
database that has memory faults known to the transmitter,
but not to the receiver. The database and the faults are
assumed to be known in full to the eavesdropper. To secure
the communication the legitimate parties share a SK.
For any λ, ǫ, σ ∈ (0, 0.5), we denote the SM capacity of
the corresponding channel by CSM(λ, ǫ, σ). Furthermore, let
RSMA (λ, ǫ, σ) and R
SM
PER(λ, ǫ, σ) denote the maximal achievable
SM rates attained by (9) from Theorem 1 and (17b) from [26,
Theorem 1], respectively. By virtue of Corollary 1 (and, more
specifically, (15)), we have that Theorem 1 is tight for the
considered channel, i.e.,
CSM(λ, ǫ, σ) = RSMA (λ, ǫ, σ), ∀λ, ǫ, σ ∈ (0, 0.5). (22)
As stated in the following proposition, RSMPER(λ, ǫ, σ) is strictly
8below capacity.
Proposition 1 There exist λ, ǫ, σ ∈ (0, 0.5) such that
RSMPER(λ, ǫ, σ) < C
SM(λ, ǫ, σ).
Proposition 1 is proven in Appendix C. The proof relies
on the observation that for RSMPER(λ, ǫ, σ), a full utilization
of the key L implies that RM is upper bounded by the
capacity of the considered channel with causal CSI. In turn,
this capacity is further upper bounded by the capacity of the
MSAF with causal CSI. Choosing the parameters λ, ǫ, σ so that
the SM capacity of the setup is strictly above the causal MSAF
capacity, the superiority of our scheme compared to [26,
Theorem 1] is established.
Remark 9 This example actually demonstrates that [21, The-
orem 1] (which is a special case of Theorem 1, when RK = 0)
achieves strictly higher SM rates than [26, Theorem 1].
B. SM Transmission over SD-WTCs
In [21, Theorem 1] a lower bound was established on the
SS SM capacity (i.e., when RK = 0) over the considered
SD-WTC. The SS SM capacity CSMSem was lower bounded by
CSMSem ≥ RGCP , max
qU,V,X|S
RGCP
(
qU,V,X|S
)
, (23a)
where, for any qU,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ),
RGCP
(
qU,V,X|S
)
, min


I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S),
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
I(U, V ;Y )− I(V ;Z|U)− I(U ;S)

 , (23b)
and the MI terms are taken with respect to
WSqU,V,X|SWY,Z|S,X .
RGCP is the projection in the (RM , RK)-plane of RA from
Theorem 1 to the RM axis when RK = 0. The main difference
between the coding scheme from [21] and our superposition
code is the additional index k ∈ Kn in the outer layer of
the codebook (which also encodes the SM m ∈ Mn). Along
with the other redundancy indices, k is used to correlate
the transmission with the observed state sequence via the
likelihood encoder [27]. Based on distribution approximation
arguments we show that K is approximately independent of
the message M and approximately uniform. The pair (M,K)
is known to the transmitter and is reliably decoded by the
receiver. Finally, by securing K along with M in our analysis,
it is established as a SK.
The intuition behind the SK construction is that, unlike the
message, the key does not have to be independent of the
state sequence, nor is it chosen by the user. Therefore, the
redundancy index, used for correlating the codewords with
the state sequence, is a valid key, as long as it is secured.
Observing that any portion of the SM can be allocated in
favor of a SK implies that (23b) is also an achievable SM-SK
trade-off region, when RM above is replaced with RM +RK ;
however, this region is sub-optimal for SK generation. RA
outperforms RGCP, e.g., in settings where an external random
source L ∼WnL is observed by both legitimate parties but not
by the eavesdropper, while the capacity of the communication
channel is zero (say, Y = Z = 0). For such a setup, the
legitimate parties may use the random source to generate a
SK of rate H(L). While Theorem 1 supports this strategy,
RGCP nullifies in this case. To see this, let S˜ , L and
Y˜ , (L, Y ) = (L, 0) be the state and the channel output
observed by the legitimate receiver, respectively. Inserting S˜
and Y˜ into the first term inside the minimum from (23b)
produces I(U, V ; Y˜ )− I(U, V ; S˜) = 0, for any qU,V,X|S˜ .
C. SK Agreement over SD-WTCs
In [25] two achievable schemes were proposed for SK
agreement over a WTC when the terminals have access to
correlated sources. The results from [25] do not imply one
another. The difference between them is that [25, Theorem 2]
is based on source and channel separation, while [25, Theorem
3] relies on joint coding.
The setup in [25] consists of three correlated sources Sx, Sy
and Sz that are observed by the encoder, the decoder and the
eavesdropper, respectively, and a SD-WTC in which the triple
(Sx, Sy, Sz) plays the role of the state. Our general framework
is defined through the state distribution WS and the SD-WTC
WY˜,Z˜|S,X . Setting S = Sx, Y˜ = (Sy, Y ) and Z˜ = (Sz, Z)
recovers the model from [25] (see Remark 1).
The first scheme from [25, Theorem 2] operates un-
der the assumption that the SD-WTC decomposes as
W(Sy,Y ),(Sz,Z)|Sx,X = WSy,Sz|SxWY,Z|X into a product of
two WTCs, one being independent of the state (given the
input), while the other one depends only on it. Thus, the
legitimate receiver (respectively, the eavesdropper) observes
not only the output Y (respectively, Z) of the WTC WY,Z|X ,
but also Sy (respectively, Sz) - a noisy version of the state
sequence drawn according to the corresponding conditional
marginal of WSy,Sz|Sx . This scheme shows that the SK
capacity CSK is lower bounded by
CSK ≥ R
(Separate)
BPS ,max
[
I(T ;Y |Q)− I(T ;Z|Q)
+ I(V˜ ;Sy|U˜)− I(V˜ ;Sz|U˜)
]
, (24)
where the maximization is over all qV˜ |SxqU˜|V˜ : Sx →
P(V˜ × U˜) and qQ,T qX|T ∈ P(Q×T ×X ) that give rise to a
joint PMFWSx,Sy,SzqV˜ |SxqU˜|V˜ ×qQ,T qX|TWY,Z|X satisfying
I(U˜ ;Sx|Sy) ≤ I(Q;Y ) and I(V˜ ;Sx|Sy) ≤ I(T ;Y ). With
respect to this distribution, (Sy , Sz)−
−Sx−
−V−
−U
and Q−
−T−
−X−
−(Y, Z) form Markov chains and
(Sy, Sz, Sx, V, U) are independent of (Q, T,X, Y, Z). This
independence is the essence of separation that uses the
channel for two purposes: carrying communication for SK
agreement based on the sources, and securing part of this
communication using wiretap coding.
Setting RM = 0, U = (Q, U˜), V = (T, V˜ ) in The-
orem 1, and limiting the union to joint PMFs that satisfy
I(U ;Sy, Y ) ≥ I(U ;Sx), recovers (24).
The joint coding scheme from [25, Theorem 3] does not
rely on the aforementioned decomposition of the SD-WTC
9W(Sy,Y ),(Sz,Z)|S,Xx . It lower bounds C
SK as
CSK ≥ R
(Joint)
BPS , max
[
I(V˜ ;Sy, Y |U˜)− I(V˜ ;Sz, Z|U˜)
]
,
(25)
where the maximization is over all qV˜,X|SxqU˜|V˜ :
Sx → P(V˜ × X × U˜) that give rise to a joint PMF
WSxqV˜,X|SxqU˜|V˜W(Sy ,Y ),(Sz,Z)|Sx,X satisfying I(U˜ ;Sx) ≤
I(U˜ ;Sy, Y ) and I(V˜ ;Sx|U˜) ≤ I(V˜ ;Sy, Y |U˜). Setting RM =
0 and (U, V ) = (U˜, V˜ ) in Theorem 1, where (U˜, V˜ ) is a valid
auxiliary pair for R
(Joint)
BPS , recovers (25).
It was shown in [25] that, in some cases, the separation-
based scheme achieves strictly higher rates than the joint
coding scheme, i.e., that R
(Separate)
BPS > R
(Joint)
BPS . As Theo-
rem 1 captures both these results, it unifies the two schemes
from [25], and, in particular, outperforms R
(Joint)
BPS . Since the
results from [25] were derived under the weak secrecy metric,
Theorem 1 also upgrades them to SS (which is equivalent to
strong secrecy when only SK generation is of interest).
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The subsequently presented proof follows lines similar to
those from the proof of [21, Theorem 1]. Several claims
herein are recovered from corresponding assertions in [21]
by identifying the index j in [21] with the pair (j, k) in our
scheme. The proofs of such claims are omitted, and the reader
is referred to [21].
Fix ǫ > 0 and a conditional PMF qU,V,X|S : S → P(U×V×
X ). For any n ∈ N, let pM ∈ P(Mn) be the message distri-
bution. We first show that for any (RM , RK) ∈ RA
(
qU,V,X|S
)
there exists a SS sequence of (n,RM , RK)-codes with a key
distribution that is approximately uniform conditioned on any
message, and a vanishing average error probability. We then
use the expurgation technique [37, Theorem 7.7.1] to ensure
a vanishing maximal error probability. This is done without
harming the SS and the statistical properties of the key, since
they hold for each message in the original message set.
Codebook Bn:We use a superposition codebook where the
outer layer carries both the SM and the SK. The codebook is
constructed independently of S, but has sufficient redundancy
to enable correlating the transmission with it.
Define the index sets In ,
[
1 : 2nR1
]
and Jn ,
[
1 : 2nR2
]
.
Let B
(n)
U ,
{
U(i)
}
i∈In
be a random inner layer codebook,
which is a set of random vectors of length n that are i.i.d.
according to qnU . An outcome of B
(n)
U is denoted by B
(n)
U ,{
u(i)
}
i∈In
.
To describe the outer layer codebook, fix B
(n)
U and, for every
i ∈ In let B
(n)
V (i) ,
{
V(i, j, k,m)
}
(j,k,m)∈Jn×Kn×Mn
be a
collection of i.i.d. random vectors of length n with distribution
qnV |U=u(i). For each i ∈ In, an outcome of B
(n)
V (i) given B
(n)
U
is denoted by B
(n)
V (i) ,
{
v(i, j, k,m)
}
(j,k,m)∈Jn×Kn×Mn
.
We also set BV =
{
BV (i)
}
i∈In
and denote its realizations
by BV . Finally, a random superposition codebook is given by
Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
, while Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
denotes a fixed
codebook.
LetBn be the set of all possible outcomes of Bn. The above
codebook construction induces a PMF µ ∈ P(Bn) over the
codebook ensemble. For every Bn ∈ Bn, we have
µ(Bn) =
∏
i∈In
qnU
(
u(i)
) ∏
(
iˆ,j,k,m
)
∈In×Jn×Kn×Mm
qnV |U
(
v
(
iˆ, j, k,m
)∣∣∣u(ˆi)).
(26)
The encoder and decoder are described next for any superpo-
sition codebook Bn ∈ Bn.
Encoder f
(Bn)
n : The encoding function is based on the
likelihood-encoder [27], which allows us to approximate the
induced joint distribution by a simple distribution that we use
for the analysis. Given m ∈ Mn and s ∈ Sn, the encoder
randomly chooses (i, j, k) ∈ In × Jn ×Kn according to
p
(Bn)
LE (i, j, k|m, s) =
qnS|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i),v(i, j, k,m))∑
(i′,j′,k′)
∈In×Jn×Kn
qn
S|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i′),v(i′, j′, k′,m)) ,
(27)
where qS|U,V is the conditional marginal of qS,U,V defined by
qS,U,V (s, u, v) =
∑
x∈X WS(s)qU,V,X|S(u, v, x|s), for every
(s, u, v) ∈ S ×U ×V . The encoder declares the chosen index
k ∈ Kn as the key. The channel input sequence is generated by
feeding the chosen u- and v-codewords along with the state
sequence into the DM channel qX|U,V,S , i.e., it is sampled
from the random vector X ∼ qn
X|U=u(i),V=v(i,j,k,m),S=s.
Accordingly, the (stochastic) encoding function fn :Mn×
Sn → P(Kn ×Xn) is given by
f (Bn)n (k,x|m, s) =
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
[
p
(Bn)
LE (i, j, k|m, s) (28)
×qnX|U,V,S
(
x
∣∣u(i),v(i, j, k,m), s)].
Decoder φ
(Bn)
n : Upon observing y ∈ Yn, the decoder
searches for a unique tuple (ˆi, jˆ, kˆ, mˆ) ∈ In×Jn×Kn×Mn
such that (
u(ˆi),v(ˆi, jˆ, kˆ, mˆ),y
)
∈ T nǫ (qU,V,Y ). (29)
If such a unique quadruple is found, then set φ
(Bn)
n (y) =(
mˆ, kˆ
)
; otherwise, φ
(Bn)
n (y) = (1, 1).
The quadruple (Mn,Kn, f
(Bn)
n , φ
(Bn)
n ) defined with respect
to the codebook Bn is an (n,RM , RK)-code cn. For any
message distribution pM ∈ P(Mn) and codebook Bn ∈ Bn,
the induced joint distribution p(Bn) over Mn × Sn × In ×
Jn ×Kn × Un × Vn ×Xn × Yn ×Zn × Mˆn × Kˆn is
p(Bn)(m, s, i, j, k,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ, kˆ)
= pM (m)W
n
S (s)p
(Bn)
LE (i, j, k|m, s)
× 1{
u=u(i)
}
∩
{
v=v(i,j,k,m)
}qnX|U,V,S(x|u,v, s)
×WnY,Z|S,X(y, z|s,x)1
{
(mˆ,kˆ)=φ(Bn)n (y)
}. (30)
If pM = p
(U)
Mn
, i.e., the message distribution is uni-
form, we write p¯(Bn) instead of p(Bn). If p(Bn) appears
with no explicitly stated argument, it should be interpreted
as p(Bn)(m, s, i, j, k,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ, kˆ). This abbreviation is
10
used for p¯(Bn) and the approximating distributions, stated next,
as well.
Approximating Distribution: For each pM ∈ P(Mn) and
Bn ∈ Bn, define the distribution
π(Bn)(m, i, j, k,u,v, s,x,y, z, mˆ, kˆ)
, pM (m)
1
|In||Jn||Kn|
1{
u=u(i),v=v(i,j,k,m)
}
× qnS|U,V (s|u,v)q
n
X|U,V,S(x|u,v, s)
×WnY,Z|S,X(y, z|s,x)1
{
(mˆ,kˆ)=φ(Bn)n (y)
}. (31)
As before, π¯(Bn) stands for π(Bn) when pM = p
(U)
Mn
. This
distribution describes a setup where the codeword indices
(i, j, k) are chosen uniformly at random, whereas the state
sequence s is the output of a DM prefix channel qS|U,V .
Consequently, the effective channel from (U, V ) to (Y, Z) in
the approximating setup is
qY,Z|U,V (y, z|u, v) = (32)∑
(s,x)∈S×X
qS|U,V (s|u, v)qX|U,V,S(x|u, v, s)WY,Z|S,X(y, z|s, x).
Notably, qY,Z|U,V is not SD, which allows simple reliabil-
ity and security analyses. We subsequently show that for a
random codebook Bn with appropriately chosen rates (see
Lemma 1 below), p(Bn) and π(Bn) are close in total variation,
with high probability. Therefore, one may analyze the code’s
performance with respect to either of the two. The simplicity
of π(Bn) makes it preferable for the analysis.
The following lemma states sufficient conditions for π(Bn)
to be a good approximation (in total variation) of p(Bn) with
double-exponential certainty.
Lemma 1 (Sufficient Conditions for Approximation) If
R1 > I(U ;S), (33a)
R1 +R2 +RK > I(U, V ;S), (33b)
then there exist α1, α2 > 0, such that for any n large enough
Pµ
(
max
pM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn) − π(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nα1
)
≤ e−e
nα2
.
(34)
In particular, for any such n it also holds that
Eµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣p¯(Bn) − π¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nα1 + n log
(
1
ξS
)
e−e
nα2
, (35)
where ξS = mins∈supp(WS)WS(s) > 0. The subscript µ in
Pµ and Eµ indicates that the probability measure and the
expectation are taken with respect to the random codebook
Bn ∼ µ.
Lemma 1 essentially restates [21, Lemma 7] with the index
j therein replaced here with the pair (j, k). The proof of
Lemma 1 relies on the strong SCL for superposition codes and
some basic properties of total variation. Due to the similarity
to [21, Lemma 7] we omit the proof and the reader is referred
to [21].
Lemma 1 is key for analyzing the performance of the
proposed code. The reliability analysis that is presented next
exploits the convergence of the expected value from (35) to
show that the average error probability can be made arbitrarily
small. The expurgation method [37, Theorem 7.7.1] is used in
a later stage of this proof to upgrade to a vanishing maximal
error probability.
Average Error Probability Analysis: The average error
probability3 e¯(Bn) associated with a codebook Bn is
e¯(Bn) ,
1
|Mn|
∑
m∈Mn
em(Bn)
= Pp¯(Bn)
((
Mˆ, Kˆ
)
6= (M,K)
)
. (36)
Our next step is to establish that the expected value of e¯(Bn)
over the codebook ensemble is approximately the same under
p¯ and π¯. Then, the expected average error probability under
π¯ is analyzed and shown to converge to zero as n→∞. Due
to the simple structure of π¯, this analysis requires nothing
but standard typicality arguments. To do so we use the two
following lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Average Error Prob. Under p¯(Bn) and π¯(Bn))
The following relation holds:∣∣∣EµPp¯(Bn) ((Mˆ,Kˆ) 6=(M,K))− EµPπ¯(Bn) ((Mˆ,Kˆ) 6=(M,K)) ∣∣∣
≤ Eµ
∣∣∣∣p¯(Bn) − π¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣
TV
. (37)
Lemma 2 is a simple consequence of the definition of total
variation and the linearity of expectation. For the proof of
Lemma 2 and the following Lemma 3, the reader is referred
to the Average Error Probability Analysis part in Section VI-B
of [21].
Lemma 3 (Average Error Probability Under π¯(Bn)) If the
rate tuple (RM , RK , R1, R2) satisfies
RM +RK +R2 < I(V ;Y |U), (38a)
RM +RK +R1 +R2 < I(U, V ;Y ), (38b)
then
EµPπ¯(Bn)
((
Mˆ, Kˆ
)
6= (M,K)
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0. (39)
Since π(Bn) describes a setup where the channel is not SD
(see (31)-(32)), standard typicality decoding arguments for
superposition codes apply, and, in turn, imply the result of
Lemma 3. We stress that the conditions in (38) ensure reliable
decoding of the four indices (i, j, k,m), and, in particular, of
the SM-SK pair (m, k).
Combining the claims of Lemmas 2-3 with (35) from
Lemma 1, we have that as long as (38) and (33) are satisfied
Eµe¯(Bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. (40)
Key Analysis: The structure of π(Bn) from (31) implies that
for any Bn ∈ Bn and m ∈ Mn we have π
(Bn)
K|M=m = p
(U)
Kn
.
Adopting the same abuse of notation we used for the reliability
3We slightly abuse notation here because e¯ and em are actually functions
of the code cn rather than the codebook Bn. However, since Bn uniquely
defines cn we prefer this presentation for the sake of simplicity.
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analysis, we use Lemma 1 to upper bound the probability
that δ(Bn) does not decay exponentially fast to zero as n
grows. Therefore, assuming (33) holds, we have that there
exists η1, η2 > such that
Pµ
(
δ(Bn) > e
−nη1
)
= Pµ
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn)K|M=m − p(U)Kn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nη1
)
= Pµ
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn)K|M=m − π(Bn)K|M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣TV > e−nη1
)
≤ Pµ
(
max
pM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn)M,K − π(Bn)M,K∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nη1
)
≤ Pµ
(
max
pM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn) − π(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nη1
)
(a)
≤ e−e
nη2
, (41)
where (a) is by (34) from Lemma 1. We proceed with the
security analysis.
Security Analysis: This part mainly deals with analyzing
the SS metric under the distribution π(Bn). The following
lemma explains the reason for doing so. It states conditions
under which SS under π(Bn) implies SS under p(Bn). These
conditions are assured, with hight probability, by Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 (SS for p(Bn) and π(Bn)) Let Bn ∈ Bn and β1 >
0, such that for all pM ∈ P(Mn) and n sufficiently large
(independent of pM )∣∣∣∣∣∣pMp(Bn)K,Z|M − pMπ(Bn)K,Z|M ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nβ1 . (42)
Then, there exist β2 > 0 such that for all pM ∈ P(Mn) and
large enough values of n (independent of pM ), we have∣∣∣Ip(Bn)(M,K;Z)− Iπ(Bn)(M,K;Z)∣∣∣ ≤ e−nβ2, (43)
where the subscripts p(Bn) and π(Bn) indicate that a mutual
information term is calculated with respect to the correspond-
ing PMF.
The proof of Lemma 4 extends that of [21, Lemma 8], and
can be found in [2, Appendix D].
For any n ∈ N and β1 > 0, define the collection of
codebooks
An (β1) ,
{
Bn
∣∣∣∣ max
pM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(Bn) − π(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nβ1
}
.
(44)
We note that Lemma 1 guarantees that if (33) is satisfied, then
there exist β1 > 0 such that Pµ
(
Bn /∈ An (β1)
)
vanishes
doubly exponentially fast with n. Lemma 4 then ensures that
if Bn ∈ An(β1), for some β1 > 0 and sufficiently large n,
then there exists β2 > 0, such that
ℓSem(Bn) , max
pM∈P(Mn)
Ip(Bn)(M,K;Z)
≤ max
pM∈P(Mn)
Iπ(Bn)(M,K;Z) + e
−nβ2 , (45)
for large enough n. Therefore, to demonstrate that the code
corresponding to any Bn ∈ An(β1) is semantically-secured it
suffices to show that maxpM∈P(Mn) Iπ(Bn)(M,K;Z) can be
made arbitrarily small.
Fix Bn ∈ An(β1) and pM ∈ P(Mn), and consider
Iπ(Bn)(M,K;Z) ≤ Iπ(Bn)(M,K; I,U,Z)
= D
(
π
(Bn)
M,K,Z,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)Z,I,U)
(a)
= D
(
π
(Bn)
M,Kπ
(Bn)
I,U π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U π(Bn)Z|I,U)
(b)
= D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U )
(c)
≤ D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U ), (46)
where (a) is because π
(Bn)
M,K,I,U = π
(Bn)
M,Kπ
(Bn)
I,U (see (31)), (b)
is by the relative entropy chain rule, while (c) follows from
D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U )
= D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U )
− D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U ) (47)
and the non-negativity of relative entropy. Here, qZ|U is
the conditional marginal of the single-letter distribution
WSqU,V,X|SWY,Z|S,X .
Maximizing both sides of (46) over all message distributions
pM ∈ P(Mn), we further have
max
pM∈P(Mn)
Iπ(M,K;Z)
≤ max
pM∈P(Mn)
D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M,K,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)M,Kπ(Bn)I,U )
= max
pM∈P(Mn)
∑
(m,k)∈Mn×Kn
[
π
(Bn)
M,K(m, k)
× D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M=m,K=k,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U )
]
≤ max
pM∈P(Mn)
∑
(m,k)∈Mn×Kn
[
π
(Bn)
M,K(m, k)
× max
(m˜,k˜)∈M×Kn
D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M=m˜,K=k˜,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U )
]
= max
(m,k)∈Mn×Kn
D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M=m,K=k,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U ). (48)
Inserting (48) into (45), for a sufficiently large n, we deduce
there exists β2 > 0 such that
ℓSem(Bn) ≤ (49)
max
(m,k)∈Mn×Kn
D
(
π
(Bn)
Z|M=m,K=k,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣qnZ|U ∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U ) + e−nβ2.
The two following lemmas state conditions under which the
probability that the RHS of (49) vanishes exponentially fast
with n is double-exponentially close to 1.
Lemma 5 (Total Variation Dominates Relative Entropy)
Let X and Y be finite sets, and for any n ∈ N let
pX ∈ P(Xn), pY|X : X
n → P(Yn) and qY |X : X → P(Y).
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If pY|X=x ≪ q
n
Y |X=x, for all x ∈ X
n, i.e., pY|X=x is
absolutely continuous with respect to qnY |X=x, then
D
(
pY|X
∣∣∣∣qnY |X ∣∣pX) ≤ ∣∣∣∣pXpY|X − pXqnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV (50)
×
(
n log |Y|+ log
1∣∣∣∣pXpY|X − pXqnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV + n log ξY |X
)
,
where ξY |X is the minimal non-zero value of the transition
matrix qY |X .
Lemma 5 is [21, Lemma 9] and its proof is omitted.
It is readily verified that π
(Bn)
Z|M=m,K=k,I=i,U=u ≪ q
n
Z|U=u,
for each (m, i, k,u) ∈ Mn × In × Kn × Un. Combining
Lemma 5 and (49), we see that if Bn ∈ An(β1) and
max
(m,k)
∈Mn×Kn
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U π(Bn)Z|M=m,K=k,I,U−π(Bn)I,U qnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nζ1 ,
(51a)
for some β1, ζ1 > 0 and n sufficiently large, then there exists
ζ2 > 0 for which
ℓSem(Bn) ≤ e
−nζ2 (51b)
as n grows.
Lemma 6 (Sufficient Conditions for SS) If the rate tuple
(RM , RK , R1, R2) ∈ R4+ satisfies (33a) and
R2 > I(V ;Z|U), (52)
then there exist γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n sufficiently large
Pµ
(
max
(m,k)
∈Mn×Kn
∣∣∣∣∣∣π(Bn)I,U π(Bn)Z|M=m,K=k,I,U
− π
(Bn)
I,U q
n
Z|U
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (53)
Lemma 6 follows by the security analysis from [21] with
(M,K) = (m, k) in the role of M = m therein.
Combining the lemma with Lemma 1 and (51), we deduce
that if (33) and (52) hold, then there exist τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5 > 0
(dependent among themselves but independent of n), such that
for any sufficiently large n
Pµ
(
ℓSem(Bn) > e
−nτ1
)
≤ Pµ
(
ℓSem(Bn)>e
−nτ1
∣∣∣Bn∈An(τ3))+Pµ(Bn /∈An(τ3))
≤ e−e
nτ4
+ e−e
nτ5
≤ e−e
nτ2
. (54)
Code Extraction: The above derivation shows that if (33),
(38) and (52) are simultaneously satisfied, then
Eµe¯(Bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (55a)
and for sufficiently large n, we also have
Pµ
(
δ(Bn) > e
−nη1
)
≤ e−e
nη2
, (55b)
Pµ
(
ℓSem(Bn) > e
−nτ1
)
≤ e−e
nτ2
. (55c)
The Selection Lemma from [11, Lemma 5] implies the
existence of a sequence of superposition codebooks
{
Bn
}
n∈N
(an outcome of the random codebook sequence
{
Bn
}
n∈N
), for
which
e¯(Bn) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (56a)
1{
δ(Bn)>e−nη1
} −−−−→
n→∞
0, (56b)
1{
ℓSem(Bn)>e−nτ1
} −−−−→
n→∞
0. (56c)
Since the indicator functions in (56b)-(56c) take only the
values 0 and 1, we have that for any n large enough
δ(Bn) ≤ e
−nη1 , (57a)
ℓSem(Bn) ≤ e
−nτ1 . (57b)
On account of (55a) and (57), we have that {Bn}n∈N is
semantically-secured, satisfies the target key statistics, and is
reliable with respect to the average error probability.
Our last step is to upgrade {Bn}n∈N to have a small
maximal error probability. This is a standard step that uses
the expurgation technique (see, e.g., [37, Theorem 7.7.1]).
Namely, pushing the average error probability below ǫ2 , at least
half of the messages inMn result in a probability of error that
is at most ǫ. Throwing away the rest of the messages ensures
a maximal error probability that is at most ǫ, while inflicting a
negligible rate loss. Discarding those messages does not harm
the SS or the key uniformity and independence metric, thus
producing a new sequence of codes that satisfies (7). Applying
the Fourier-Motzkin Elimination on (33), (38) and (52) shows
that any SM-SK rate pair (RM , RK) ∈ RA
(
qU,V,X|S
)
is
achievable, which concludes the proof.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We studied the trade-off between the SM and SK rates
that are simultaneously achievable over a SD-WTC with non-
causal encoder CSI. This model subsumes all other instances
of CSI availability as special cases. An inner bound on the
SS SM-SK capacity region was derived based on a superposi-
tion coding scheme, the likelihood encoder and soft-covering
arguments inspired by [21].
We presented a class of SD-WTCs for which our inner
bound achieves capacity, and showed that for this class, the
previously best known SM-SK trade-off region by Prabhakaran
et al. [26] is strictly sub-optimal. Furthermore, we showed
that the inner bound derived here recovers the best lower
bounds on either the SM [21] or the SK [25] rate achievable
over the considered SD-WTC. Our derivations ensure SS, thus
upgrading the security standard from most of the past results,
which were derived under the weak secrecy metric.
As the SM-SK capacity region for this setup remains an
open problem, good outer bounds are of particular interest.
Extensions to multiple terminals, action dependent states [38],
and source reconstruction models should be examined as well.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Recall that the SD less-noisy-eavesdropper WTC with a key
is the
(
S˜,X , Y˜,Z,WS˜ ,WY˜,Z|S˜,X
)
SD-WTC, where S˜ =
13
L × S, Y˜ = L × Y , WS˜ = WL × WS , S˜ = (L, S),
Y˜ = (L′, Y ), whose transition matrix satisfies (13) and the
less-noisy condition.
A qU,X|S,L induces a joint distribution over L × S × U ×
X × Y × Z that is given by
qL,S,U,X,Y,Z , WLWSqU,X|S,LWY,Z|S,X . (58)
We now proceed with the direct and the converse proofs.
Direct: Fix qU,X|S such that (U,X)−
−S−
−L. The struc-
ture of (58) further implies that (S,U,X, Y, Z) ⊥ L. Evalu-
ating the bounds from Theorem 1 with respect to (58), while
setting V = (L,U) and using S˜ = (L, S) and Y˜ = (L, Y ),
we have
RM ≤ I(U, V ; Y˜ )− I(U, V ; S˜)
= I(L,U ;L, Y )− I(L,U ;L, S)
= I(U ;Y |L)− I(U ;S|L)
(a)
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S), (59a)
where (a) is because (S,U, Y ) are independent of L. Combin-
ing the two bounds on the sum RM +RK in one, we further
have
RK+RM ≤ I(V ; Y˜ |U)−I(V ;Z|U)−
[
I(U ; S˜)−I(U ; Y˜ )
]+
= I(L;L, Y |U)− I(L;Z|U)−
[
I(U ;L, S)− I(U ;L, Y )
]+
(a)
= H(L)−
[
I(U ;S)− I(U ;Y )
]+
, (59b)
where, similarly to the above, (a) is implied by the in-
dependence of (S,U, Y, Z) and L. Finally, due to (59a),
any joint distribution that produces a non-zero achievable
region satisfies I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;S) ≥ 0; hence, the term[
I(U ;S) − I(U ;Y )
]+
from (59b) is zero. Maximizing over
all qU,X|S concludes the proof.
Converse: To get (14a), notice that the secret commu-
nication rate of the setup cannot exceed the total reliable
communication rate. Therefore, an upper bound on the SM
capacity is given by the GP channel capacity formula [19]:
max
qU,X|S˜
[
I(U ; Y˜ )− I(U ; S˜)
]
, (60)
where, for each qU,X|S˜ , the underlying joint PMF is
qU,X|S˜WY˜ |S˜,X , with S˜ = (L, S) and Y˜ = (L, Y ). We thus
have
RM ≤ max
qU,X|L,S
[
I(U ;L, Y )− I(U ;L, S)
]
= max
qU,X|L,S
[
I(U ;Y |L)− I(U ;S|L)
]
(a)
= max
qU,X|L,S
[
I(U ;Y |L)− I(L,U ;S)
]
≤ max
qU,X|L,S
[
I(L,U ;Y )− I(L,U ;S)
]
≤ max
qL,U,X|S
[
I(L,U ;Y )− I(L,U ;S)
]
(b)
= max
qU,X|S
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
]
, (61)
where (a) follows because L and S are independent (see (58)),
while (b) follows by recasting (L,U) as U .
For the bound on RM +RK from (14b), consider
H(M,K)
(a)
≤ I(M,K;L,Y) +H(M,K|L,Y)− I(M,K;Z) + nǫ˜n
(b)
≤ I(M,K;L,Y)− I(M,K;Z) + nǫn
= I(M,K;L|Y) + I(M,K;Y)− I(M,K;Z) + nǫn
(c)
≤ I(M,K;L|Y) + nǫn ≤ n(H(L) + ǫn), (62)
where (a) uses the security hypothesis; (b) is Fano’s inequality;
whereas (c) follows the less-noisy property of the channel
since (M,K)−
−X−
−(Y,Z) is a Markov chain.
Finally, since the code guarantees reliable communication
for any message distribution, we can consider the case that it is
uniform, while the key distribution (approximate) uniformity
is guaranteed by the key properties. Thus
RM +RK ≤
1
n
H(M,K) + ǫˆn ≤ H(L) + ˆˆǫn, (63)
which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THEOREM 1 FROM [29]
We first restate [29, Theorem 1] through the notations of this
work. This theorem proposes the following lower bound on the
SK capacity CSK of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder
CSI: 4
CSK ≥ RZib , max
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
, (64a)
where the maximization is over all conditional PMFs qU|V :
V → P(U) and qV,X|S : S → P(V × X ) satisfying
I(V ;Y ) ≥ I(V ;S). (64b)
All the above MI terms are taken with respect to the
appropriate marginals of WSqU|V qV,X|SWY,Z|S,X , where
U−
−V−
−(S,X)−
−(Y, Z) forms a Markov chain.
We next show that (64) cannot be an inner bound on the
SK capacity of the GP-WTC. This is proven by constructing
an example for which RZib exceeds the SK capacity. Consider
the following:
• Let A, B and Q be three i.i.d. Ber(12 ) random variables.
Also, set An, Bn and Qn as three n-fold random vectors
whose coordinates are i.i.d. copies of A, B and Q,
respectively.
• For each i ∈ [1 : n], let Ti = t(Ai, Bi, Qi), where t :
{0, 1}3 → {0, 1} is the deterministic function
t(a, b, q) =
{
a, q = 0
b, q = 1
. (65)
• Let fn be the stochastic encoder and Ψ
n be the binary
sequence that fn produces and transmits over a private
binary bit-pipe to the legitimate receiver.
4 [29, Theorem 1] considers a setting with state observations at the receiver
and the eavesdropper, and a public communication link. As explained in
Remark 1, such a setup is a special case of the GP-WTC. Using the technique
described in Remark 8, it can be verified that [29, Theorem 1] (in its original
form) is recoverable from its restatement here.
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• The encoder observes (An, Bn) non-causally and deter-
mines the binary bit-pipe transmission Ψn.
• The decoder observes (Qn, T n,Ψn).
• The eavesdropper observes An ⊕n Bn, where ⊕n stands
for bit-wise addition modulo 2. (At each time instance
the eavesdropper observes Ai +Bi (mod 2).)
Thus, at each channel use i ∈ [1 : n], the encoder observes
two fair coin tosses, Ai and Bi. The decoder observes only
one of them, namely Ti, chosen at random (using a third fair
coin Qi). The decoder knows which coin it observes, but the
encoder does not. There is a private bit-pipe from the encoder
to the decoder, which enables the transmission of a single
noiseless bit each time the coins are flipped. The legitimate
parties wish to agree upon a key that is kept secret from the
eavesdropper, who observes only the modulo 2 addition of the
two coins, Ai ⊕Bi, each time they are flipped.
Denoting the SK generated by the legitimate parties by Kn,
the induced joint PMF of the system is
qAn,Bn,Qn,Tn,Ψn,Kn(a
n, bn, qn, tn, ψn, kn)
= fn(kn, ψ
n|an, bn)
×
n∏
i=1
[
WA(ai)WB(bi)WQ(qi)1{Ti=t(ai,bi,qi)}
]
. (66)
To see that the example falls within the framework of our
model, note that (A,B, T,Q) are correlated random sources
(i.i.d. across time), such that the encoder, decoder and eaves-
dropper observe (A,B), (T,Q) and A ⊕ B, respectively. In
addition, there is a noiseless channel, independent of the
sources, between the legitimate parties. In the notation of
Remark 1 this corresponds to St = (A,B), Sr = (T,Q),
Se = A⊕B, X = Y˜ = Ψ and Z˜ = 0 , such that:
WSr,Se|St =W(Q,T ),Se|A,B =WQ1{T=t(A,B,Q)}1{Se=A⊕B},
WY˜,Z˜|St,Sr,Se,X = 1{Y˜=X=Ψ}1{Z˜=0},
and S = St = (A,B), Y = (Sr, Y˜ ) = (T,Q,Ψ) and Z =
(Se, Z˜) = A⊕B.
A valid choice of random variables for (64) is 5
1) Ψ ∼ Ber(12 ) independent of (A,B,Q),
2) U = Z = A⊕ B,
3) V = (A,B,Ψ),
which achieves RZib = 2. Hence, by showing that the SK
capacity of the proposed setup is strictly less than 2, we
contradict the achievability of RZib from [29, Theorem 1] as a
SK rate for this setup. We do so by showing that the vanishing
average error probability and the weak secrecy of the SK, used
in the definition of achievability in [29], cannot coexist in this
setup while a SK rate of 2 is attained.
Consider a sequence of codes {cn}n∈N achieving RZib = 2
for the above setup. We have that there exists a sequence {ǫn},
with limn→∞ ǫn = 0, such that
H(Kn) ≥ 2n− nǫn, (67a)
H(Ψn) ≤ n, (67b)
5 To use the original notations of [29] we identify U, V, St, Sr , Se, X, Y˜, Z˜
we use, respectively, with W,U, S,B, E,X, Y, Z from [29], where CP = 0.
H(Kn|Ψ
n, Snr ) ≤ nǫn, (67c)
I(Kn;Z
n) ≤ nǫn, (67d)
where:
(67a) follows by the definition of SK rate achievability.
(67b) is because the alphabet of Ψn is of size 2n and since a
uniform distribution maximizes discrete entropy.
(67c) is Fano’s inequality, following the requirement of van-
ishing decoding error.
(67d) is the weak secrecy requirement.
Lemma 7 For the considered setup, the SK capacity is upper
bounded by 2 bits per channel use,
CSK ≤ 2. (68)
Lemma 7 follows because the considered setup, but without an
eavesdropper (i.e., when Z = 0), falls within the framework of
the common randomness (CR) problem in Model i from [39].
Proof: Theorem 4.1 in [39] shows that the CR capacity
is upper bounded by
CCR ≤ R+ I(S;Sr), (69)
where R is the rate of the communication link between the
transmitter and the receiver. Evaluating the RHS of (69) with
respect to the considered setup shows that it equals 2 (CR
bits per channel use). This upper bound remains valid when
a security requirement is introduced, since it can only reduce
the admissible rates.
Lemma 7 guarantees the existence of a sequence {ǫ′n}, with
limn→∞ ǫ
′
n = 0, such that the following condition may be
added to the set (67):
H(Kn) ≤ 2n+ nǫ
′
n. (70)
Another technical lemma we need is stated next. Its proof
is omitted due to space limitations. The technique is standard,
and the full proof can be found in [2, Appendix E].
Lemma 8 If (67a)-(67c) hold, then
H(An, Bn|Kn) ≤ 4nǫn. (71)
Now, combining (70) and (71), we have
H(Kn|A
n, Bn) = H(Kn)−H(A
n, Bn) +H(An, Bn|Kn)
≤ 2n+ nǫ′n − 2n+H(A
n, Bn|Kn)
≤ (4ǫn + ǫ
′
n)n. (72)
Using (72) we can finally lower bound the conditional
information leakage term I(Kn; Ψ
n, Zn). To do so, first
consider
H(Kn|Z
n) ≤ H(Kn, A
n, Bn|Zn)
= H(An, Bn|Zn) +H(Kn|A
n, Bn, Zn)
≤ H(An, Bn|Zn) +H(Kn|A
n, Bn)
(a)
≤ H(An, Bn|Zn) + (4ǫn + ǫ
′
n)n
(b)
= H(An, Bn)−H(Zn) + (4ǫn + ǫ
′
n)n
(c)
= (1 + 4ǫn + ǫ
′
n)n, (73)
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where (a) uses (72), (b) follows by the chain rule and because
Zn is deterministically defined by (An, Bn) and (c) is since
An, Bn and Zn = An⊕nBn are all i.i.d. Ber
(
1
2
)
sequences,
and because An and Bn are independent.
Having (73), we conclude with
I(Kn;Z
n) = H(Kn)−H(Kn|Z
n)
(a)
≥ 2n− nǫn − (1 + 4ǫn + ǫ
′
n)n = (1− 5ǫn − ǫ
′
n)n, (74)
where (a) uses (67a) and (73). Evidently, (74) contradicts
(67d).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Fix σ ∈ (0, 0.5) and set
ǫ =
1
2
[
h
(σ
2
)
− σ
]
, (75a)
λ = h−1(1− σ − ǫ), (75b)
where h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and h−1 : [0, 1] → [0, 0.5] are the
binary entropy function and the inverse of its restriction to
[0, 0.5], respectively. It is readily verified that ǫ, λ ∈ (0, 0.5).
By virtue of (22), the inner bound from Theorem 1 attains the
SM capacity, which is given by (see (15))
CSM = min
{
CGP(WY |S,X), H(L)
}
, (76)
where CGP(WY |S,X) = maxqU,X|S
[
I(U ;Y )−I(U ;S)
]
is the
GP capacity of the SD channel WY |S,X with state distribution
WS . By the corollary to Theorem 2 from [40] we find that
CGP(WY |S,X) = (1 − σ)(1 − ǫ). As H(L) = 1 − σ − ǫ <
(1− σ)(1 − ǫ), we obtain 6
CSM = H(L) = 1− σ − ǫ = 1−
1
2
[
σ + h
(σ
2
)]
. (77)
We now show that RSMPER(λ, ǫ, σ) < 1−
1
2
[
σ + h
(
σ
2
)]
. Fix a
joint distribution to evaluate the region from (17b) with RK =
0, and S and Y replaced with S˜ = (L, S), Y˜ = (L, Y ). This
distribution factors as
qL,S,U,V,X,G,E,Y,Z,S˜,Y˜ ,WLWSqUqV,X|U,S,L1{G=g(S,X)}
×WE1{Y=y(E,G)}1{Z=(S,X)}1{S˜=(L,S)}∩{Y˜=(L,Y )}. (78)
Note that the independence of (L, S) and U is a restriction on
the feasible joint distributions in (17a).
Now, assume in contradiction that evaluating (17b) with
respect to q produces a rate that is at least as high as (77).
Specifically, assume that
I(U, V ; Y˜ )− I(U, V ; S˜) ≥ H(L) (79a)
and
I(V ; Y˜ |U)− I(V ;Z|U) ≥ H(L). (79b)
Consider the following upper bound on (79b).
I(V ; Y˜ |U)− I(V ;Z|U) = I(V ;L, Y |U)− I(V ;S,X |U)
= I(V ;Y |U) + I(V ;L|U, Y )− I(V ;S,X |U)
6 The achievability of (77) may also be verified directly from Theorem 1 by
substituting RK = 0, U = G, V = (U, L) and X ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
independent
of (S,L) into (8).
= I(V ;U, Y ) + I(V ;L|U, Y )− I(V ;U, S,X)
(a)
= I(V ;L|U, Y ) + I(V ;U, Y )− I(V ;U, S,X, Y )
= I(V ;L|U, Y )− I(V ;S,X |U, Y )
= H(L|U, Y )−H(L|U, V, Y )− I(V ;S,X |U, Y )
≤ H(L), (80)
where (a) uses the Markov relation V−
−(S,U,X)−
−Y ,
which follows because Y = y
(
E, g(S,X)
)
and E is inde-
pendent of (S,U, V,X) under the distribution from (78).
On account of (79b), the single inequality from (80) must
hold with equality. For this to happen, all the following
arguments must hold.
1) The conditioning is removed from the first (positive)
term, i.e., H(L) = H(L|U, Y ). This implies that L is
independent of (U, Y ).
2) The second (negative) term is zero, i.e.,
0 = H(L|U, V, Y )
(a)
= H(L|U, V, Y, E)
= (1− ǫ) ·H(L|U, V, Y, E = 0)
+ ǫ ·H(L|U, V, Y, E = 1), (81)
where (a) is because E is deterministically defined by
Y . Now, since ǫ > 0, we have that H(L|U, V, Y, E =
1) = 0. Observing that conditioned on {E = 1}, Y =?
is a constant, we further deduce
H(L|U, V, Y, E = 1) = H(L|U, V,E = 1)
(a)
= H(L|U, V ) = 0, (82)
where (a) relies on the independence of E and
(L,U, V ). The last equality in (82) implies that there
exists a (deterministic) function ℓ : U × V → L such
that L = ℓ(U, V ).
3) Expanding the third (negative) term with respect to E
in a similar manner to that presented in the above 2nd
point, we obtain
I(V ;S,X |U, Y,E = 1) = I(V ;S,X |U,E = 1)
= I(V ;S,X |U) = 0, (83)
which establishes V−
−U−
−(S,X) as a Markov chain.
Since S and U are independent under q from (78), the
Markov relation from point 3) further implies that S is
independent of the pair (U, V ). Observe that this effectively
means that the inability of the scheme from [26, Theorem 1]
to support GP coding in the inner layer implies that GP coding
is not supported at all.
We proceed to analyze (79a) under the above deductions.
Consider
I(U, V ; Y˜ )− I(U, V ; S˜) = I(U, V ;L, Y )− I(U, V ;L, S)
= I(U, V ;Y |L)− I(U, V ;S|L)
≤ I(U, V, L;Y )
(a)
≤ I(U, V, L;G)
(b)
= I(U, V ;G), (84)
where (a) follows by the Data Processing Inequality (see,
16
e.g., [37, Section 2.8]) and since (L,U, V )−
−G−
−Y forms a
Markov chain, while (b) is because L = ℓ(U, V ).
Define T = (U, V ) and observe that T is independent of S
(since the pair (U, V ) is) and that T−
−(S,X)−
−G forms a
Markov chain (since G = g(S,X)). We further upper bound
the RHS of (84) with T = (U, V ) by maximizing it over all
conditional distributions that satisfy qT,X|S = qT qX|S,T . We
thus have
I(U, V ; Y˜ )−I(U, V ; S˜) ≤ I(T ;G) ≤ max
qT qX|S,T
I(T ;G). (85)
The expression on the RHS of (85) is the capacity of the
MSAF with causal encoder knowledge of the state sequence
(cf., e.g., [41, p.5469]). However, the causal CSI is useless for
the MSAF encoder, as demonstrated in Section V-A of [41].
Omitting the availability of any CSI from the MSAF encoder,
the channel is equivalent to a binary symmetric channel with
flip probability σ2 (see (19)), whose capacity equals 1−h
(
σ
2
)
.
We conclude with
I(U, V ; Y˜ )− I(U, V ; S˜) ≤ max
qT qX|TS
I(T ;G)
= 1− h
(σ
2
) (a)
< 1−
1
2
[
σ + h
(σ
2
)]
= H(L), (86)
where (a) is because σ < h(σ2 ) for any σ ∈ (0, 0.5). This is a
contradiction to (79a).
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